As far as I can tell, for me, much of the information srtuggle in the world can be boiled down to two Vietnam era protest songs: Signs by the Five Man Electrical Band and For What it’s Worth by Buffalo Springfield, so I guess I must be some kind of closet hippy, but I can’t play any musical instruments, not like my buddy former Navy NFO and wanta be rockn'roller Ward Carroll of www.Defensetech.org.

But as I observe some recent developments on the internets, these two songs come to mind.

•  There’s battle lines being drawn, nobodies right if everyone is wrong 

• The technology of the Twenty-first Century – the “new media” – has made it possible for virtually anyone to have immediate access to an audience of millions around the world and to be somewhat anonymous. This technology has enabled and empowered the rise of a new enemy. This enemy is not constrained by the borders of a nation or the International Laws of War. The new media allows them to decentralize their command and control and disperse their elements around the globe. They stay loosely connected by an ideology, send cryptic messages across websites and via e-mail and recruit new members using the same new media technologies. 

• Responding to this challenge requires changes in our approach to warfare. The one thing we can change now does not require resources – just a change in attitudes and the organizational culture in our Army. 

Finally, this item:

• However, once we move into the informational domain, we have a tendency to be zero defect and risk averse. Leaders have to understand and accept that not all media interactions are going to go well. Leaders need to assume risk in the information domain and allow subordinates the leeway to make mistakes. Unfortunately, the culture is such that the first time a subordinate makes a mistake in dealing with the media and gets punished for it, it will be the last time ANYONE in that organization takes a risk and engages with the media.

Some observers will remember the company “Lincoln Group”, their site here and their Wikipedia page here from reports that they “planted” news stories in Iraqi newspapers. There was a huge uproar over their company, how they got their contract, and this method of getting information out.  I think both sides of this argument have a point, while it is seems distressing to have to pay to get positive stories into Iraqi newspapers, we the American people and especially our military, need to get good accurate information out there, and I don’t mean propaganda.  

Recently, former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was excoriated (yet again) by many in media for remarks he gave outlining his thoughts for communicating in the 21^st Century, NY Times article here, Sharon Weinberger at Danger Room has this post discussing the Rumsfeld speech with LOTS of links to other posts discussing the subject.  Given the world uproar over the false story of the “Koran flushing” incident which caused rioting in Afghanistan leading to at least four deaths, what are we to do?  One of our members, Canoneer no. 4 posted over at Small Wars Journal and linked to this fascinating paper discussing “Morale operations” in WWII, something I had never heard about.  The innovative and imaginative ideas for “information operations” listed there is almost unbelievable, my goodness, if we tried doing a  fraction of those today the folks at Danger Room would be leading the march carrying the torches to burn the instigators at the stake!

•  What a field-day for the heat, A thousand people in the street, Singing songs and carrying signs, Mostly say, hooray for our side 

This brings us to the last of this post, the concerns bordering on hysteria by many regarding two slides from a briefing by Major General William Chambers, USAF.  Now, there’s no one around who has had more concerns about things the Air Force does and my occasional diatribes are meant as tough love for my service. There’s tons of posts on this site from me and many others taking issue with the USAF, especially regarding lack of appropriate airpower for the counterinsurgency fight. And there are few, in my humble estimation, who are more concerned with how we organize, train, and equip our forces and fight this current fight than us here at Excalibur, I probably would have worded the slides a little different, but for once, I rise in defense of General Chambers and the USAF writ large. 

It is completely appropriate for the USAF to develop themes and highlight the fact that the other services have competing plans for future procurement and strategy. What is meant by the term “zero sum gain” quite simply, there is X amount of money to be spent, so you better make your case for your pet rock or unicorn because you are competing with another service for their mood ring.  As I said, I’m not sure I would have worded those slides the way they were, but the USAF needs to present its vision and quite possibly, compare and contrast to the other service strategies and programs.  Frankly, I personally wished the services “bought” what the Combatant Commands told them they needed, pure and simple.  But that’s not how it is. 

As Bill Sweetman put it over at Ares.com Blog, will “Everyone calm down?”  I had the privilege of working with General Chambers a couple of years ago and I found him to be one of the most squared away leaders with which I had worked. His job is to put out information that his bosses want disseminated in defense of their vision for the USAF.  Given the competing nature of our defense establishment, perhaps it’s the right time to look afresh at how we are organized.  I think it really is time for a serious “roles and missions” dialogue as House Armed Services Chair “Ike” Skelton has proposed here.  

Just a couple of for examples for the discussion:

--What is the proper way to do aerial electronic warfare and which service should be doing it?

-- How should we defend our troops from aerial attack, by airborne interceptors or by ground based systems or a mix?

-- Who should be operating strategic intelligence collection platforms?  (UAV's, manned aircraft, satellites etc.)

-- Who should be training foriegn troops and how?

-- Who should be conducting irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations, the CIA, SOF, a mix?  

These are just a few of the questions that have huge implications for policy, personnel, and budgets.  I think the next administration should start on this as job one.

As I write this post, I have begun preparations to deploy to Iraq.  I will only be over there for a few months but am looking forward to contributing to the fight. I am just happy to be given the opportunity to continue serving and have this to say to close for today:

•  I said thank you Lord for thinking about me, I'm alive and doing fine